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After more than two years of delays, the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in June 2003 held
national parliamentary elections in an effort to re-engage its stalled political liberalization
process. That process started with a great deal of fanfare in 1989, but began to reverse
itself by the time the regime signed its 1994 peace treaty with Israel. After the treaty, the
deliberalization trends continued and even showed few signs of abating after the
succession in the monarchy from King Hussein to his eldest son King Abdullah II in
1999. Given this context, the 2003 elections were deemed especially important by both
government and opposition. They were the first since 1997, the first since the dissolution
of parliament in 2001, and the first under King Abdullah II. This article provides a brief
outline of Jordan’s political liberalization since 1989, with emphasis on the results and
implications of the kingdom’s June 2003 national parliamentary elections.
Jordan’s Elections and Liberalization 
The kingdom initiated the much-heralded program of political and economic liberalization in
1989, following riots and demonstrations in southern Jordan. The public protests were not only
against the social pain associated with an International Monetary Fund austerity program, but
also corruption and nepotism in government. Stunned by the public outcry, King Hussein
initiated the liberalization program in an attempt to stabilize the country and restore public
support for the regime. In the first several years of the program, liberalization included easing
government controls over the media, restoring parliamentary life and electoral democracy for
the lower house of the legislature, and lifting martial law for the first time in more than twenty
years. By 1993 - following the 1991 creation of a new National Charter dedicated to pluralism,
liberalization, and loyalty to the Hashimite monarchy – the regime allowed for the legalization of
political parties for the first time since the 1950s. In sum, it is fair to say that Jordan’s political
liberalization process was the most extensive in the entire Arab world.
That began to change, however, as the kingdom secured its 1994 peace treaty with Israel.
Thereafter, regime tolerance for dissent declined precipitously. The opposition had, in fact,
surprised regime loyalists by taking more than half the seats in parliament after the first
elections, in 1989. In response, the regime changed the electoral law for the 1993 elections,
switching to a one-person one-vote system. The previous electoral law had allowed citizens a
number of votes matching the number of representatives for their respective (multi-member)
parliamentary district. Citizens in the city of Irbid, for example, had nine representatives in
parliament, and hence nine votes. A new electoral law ended this practice and also featured a
set of uneven electoral districts that favored rural pro-regime constituencies over more urban
bases of support for opposition groups from the secular left to the religious right. The main
concern for the Hashimite monarchy, however, was to curb the potential parliamentary power of
groups such as the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political party wing of the Muslim Brotherhood
and by far the largest and best-organized party in the kingdom.
The strategy worked and, not surprisingly, the IAF as well as secular leftist parties lost seats in
the 1993 elections. Jordan’s opposition parties then threatened an electoral boycott in 1997
unless the electoral law were reformed. When no such revision took place, the IAF led an 11
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party bloc in boycotting the 1997 elections, yielding a 1997-2001 parliament dominated by
pro-regime conservatives, tribal leaders, and very few opposition voices. That parliament,
compliant though it was, was dissolved by the king in 2001, rendering the kingdom with no
active parliament for more than two years. In that time, the palace ruled by decree, issuing a
series of controversial emergency and temporary laws. Indeed, the monarchy issued more such
laws in that two-year span than in the entire previous history of independent Jordan since 1946.
The “temporary” laws restricted media, press, and publications, clamped down on political
demonstrations, and created elastic measures to curb dissent.
In a particularly telling incident, Jordan’s first elected woman parliamentarian, Tujan al-Faysal,
was arrested for e-mailing the king with charges against the prime minister. Faysal had
suggested that the prime minister had personally benefited from legislation on insurance rates
that his government had pushed through. The former parliamentary representative was
arrested, tried, and convicted for defaming the prime minister, the government, and the
kingdom. Since Faysal is one of the most outspoken voices for liberalization and extending
women’s rights in Jordan, many in the pro-democracy movement regarded these events with
suspicion to say the least. After serving one month of her sentence, Faysal was then pardoned
by King Abdullah, but, having served time in prison, she was then thereby deprived of her right
to run again for office as the 2003 electoral campaign got underway.
Return to Liberalization? The 2003 Elections 
The new Jordanian elections represented yet another test case regarding the degree of
democratization within Jordanian politics. The regime had postponed them for more than two
years, initially over a new voter card system that would take some time to prepare. The more
pressing reason, however, may have been the return of the Palestinian Intifada, or uprising,
against Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Yet, after the Intifada began,
regional politics only destabilized further with U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In each
case, new electoral delays were announced.
In June 2003 the elections were finally held under still another electoral law. The new law,
announced in July 2001, lowered the age of voting eligibility for men and women from 19 to 18,
and increased the number of parliamentary seats from 80 to 104, with new (but still uneven)
electoral districts. In February 2003, King Abdullah added to the changes with a new decree
adding six more parliamentary seats in a specific quota to ensure minimal representation for
women. In the previous three elections (1989, 1993, and 1997) only one woman was elected to
parliament: Tujan al-Faysal. Interestingly, the Islamic Action Front had originally opposed the
women’s quota, but then included for the first time a woman, Hayat al-Musayni, among its slate
of 30 candidates. No Jordanian woman won a seat outright in 2003, but Musayni turned out to
be the top vote-getter among women candidates overall. Thus in an ironic twist, the first woman
seated in the new 2003-2007 parliament was a conservative Islamist activist.
The Islamic Action Front succeeded in getting 17 of its party members elected (including
Musayni). Aside from the IAF, five independent Islamists were also elected including such high
profile Islamists as Abd al-Munim Abu Zant, whom the IAF had expelled from membership just
before the election. Most of the parliamentary seats, however, went to traditional tribal leaders
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or former government officials. At least 62 seats out of 110, in short, went to loyalist pro-regime
figures. Voter turnout stood at 59 percent of eligible voters, with few mishaps or irregularities.
There were exceptions, however, as the IAF charged that extensive vote-rigging had taken
place in the southern city of Kerak. The government acknowledged this in part, but asserted that
the matter had been caught in time and “taken care of”, and although the overall turnout was
respectable, the numbers varied considerably across districts. Turnout in rural areas, for
example, tends to be very high, while urban Palestinian-majority districts register the lowest
turnouts in the kingdom, suggesting that these neighborhoods have limited confidence in the
government, the electoral system, and their own political efficacy.
Liberalization and Jordan’s 2003-2007 Parliament 
As Jordan’s new parliament convened for the first time, disputes arose on the first day over the
oath of loyalty itself. While all 110 MPs swore an oath of loyalty and allegience to King Abdullah,
the IAF delegates added a provision ensuring loyalty for as long as the king ruled in accordance
with Islam. The testy exchanges from the house floor may signal the type of parliament one may
expect over the next four years. While it is dominated by tribal and pro-regime figures, it does at
least include a vocal and not-at-all timid opposition. Indeed, the IAF made clear that its
participation in the elections in no way represented its approval of the electoral laws, which it
still regards as systematically biased against Islamist and Palestinian representation. Rather,
the party decided to participate in the electoral process in large part in order to change it. Dr.
Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, an IAF leader who previously served as parliamentary speaker but chose
not to run this time, stated flatly that “our decision is based on the strong belief that the time has
come to rectify all the wrongdoings that have been committed by the government over the past
years.” For the IAF, this includes not only the series of temporary laws, but also the 1994 peace
treaty with Israel. On these points, many secular left representatives agree with the Islamists.
The elections certainly were a step in the right direction in terms of reviving the liberalization
process, but for this process to continue as meaningful liberalization Jordan needs not only the
restoration of parliamentary life, and indeed not only the return of the opposition to the political
process; rather, what is also needed is a restoration of Jordan’s civil society to the more open
days of 1989-93. In this regard, the new parliament immediately began debate on all 230
temporary laws issued from 2001 to 2003. These include the controversial electoral law itself,
as well as equally controversial measures regarding public assembly, the media, the penal
code, and the municipalities. Almost all of these laws need to be reformed in some way for
Jordan to return fully to its path of political liberalization. The new municipal elections law, for
example, provides for election of half the membership of town councils, while the other half and
even the president will be government appointees. This rather clear step backwards stands in
contrast to the more positive message from the national elections themselves, and it too will be
challenged by the opposition.
Overall, the 2003 elections were a positive step - but only one step. Real momentum in reviving
full political liberalization will require changing the temporary laws and allowing for the
re-emergence of a more vibrant civil society. Should that occur, then Jordan will once again be
a model for the region.
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